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FROM: AMEMBASSY, KARACHI 556 November 3, 1951  
TO: THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON AIR POUCH  
REF: NIE-41: Department's instruction no. 26, October 1, 1951  
SUBJECT: Comments on National Intelligence Estimate Concerning  
Kashmir Dispute

In general, the Embassy concurs with the National Intelligence Estimate on "Probable Developments in the Kashmir Dispute to the End of 1951", although it believes that undue emphasis is placed on the issue of the Kashmir Constituent Assembly. The Assembly is only one of the factors which contribute to the frustration of Pakistani leaders regarding Kashmir and is not likely of itself to become a cause of war. The GOP does, however, make great use of the Assembly for purposes of both internal and external propaganda.

The Embassy has the following specific comments regarding the Estimate. Where no comment is made the Embassy concurs with the Estimate's statements.

Par 3. The Embassy does not believe that the GOP will, during the period under consideration, precipitate, deliberately launch, or sponsor local action in Kashmir, the possibility of which is suggested in the Estimate.

Par 6. The Estimate states that in an extended conflict India would probably be victorious. The Embassy concurs if Pakistan does not get extensive outside aid. If the GOP, however, gets aid in the form of artillery and all types of ammunition, Pakistan could win in a long war.

Par 9. The Estimate's information regarding the status of the Graham mission is now out of date.

Par 11. Liaquat Ali Khan did not threaten war to prevent the Constituent Assembly elections as stated in the Estimate.

Par 19. The Estimate says that Pakistan might welcome reference of the Kashmir question to the General Assembly. The GOP has, in fact, vigorously opposed referral of the question to the General Assembly. (See Embassy's telegram No. 321, September 24, 1951 and the Department's telegram No. 325, September 21, 1951).

Par 20. The Embassy does not possess information adequate for checking the figures on Indian Army strength given in this paragraph.

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Par 21. The Embassy agrees with the estimate of the numerical strength of Pakistan's Army forces. Of the 57,000 men said to be in the Wazirabad area, however, a considerable number are probably civil armed forces (Scouts, Police and National Guard). There are approximately 35,000 regulars in that area.

Par 23. While the Embassy does not disagree with the conclusion of the Estimate that in an all-out war with Pakistan, India would probably be victorious, it is believed that if neither gets from the outside any augmentation of armor or air, it is likely that within a few weeks both sides will have neither. This would benefit Pakistan.

Par 25. In the event of war, support of Pakistan by the Pathan tribesmen might be a mixed blessing. The tribesmen, often more interested in loot than principle, are likely to be quite difficult to control in a planned military campaign.

Par 32. The Embassy does not believe that Pakistan will deliberately launch or sponsor local action in Kashmir, the possibility of which is suggested in the Estimate.

Par 33. As already indicated, the Embassy does not feel that the Constituent Assembly plays such an important part in the decisions of the Government of Pakistan. The statement that "GOP leaders might believe that...hostilities in Kashmir would bring about immediate UN action favorable to Pakistan" represents in the Embassy's opinion the most valid reason why Pakistan might eventually encourage the tribesmen and Azad Kashmir forces to attack in Kashmir.

APPENDIX: In the table of Comparative Strengths of Indian and Pakistani Armed Forces, Pakistan Army strength should be revised to show seven Infantry Divisions instead of one. Pakistan's strength in aircraft should be revised to show sixty-seven Hawker Furies instead of sixty-eight and five Halifaxes instead of six.

(signed) Avra M. Warren

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : New Delhi 1258 12/6/51

TO : The Department of State, Washington AIR POUCH

REF : Department's Instruction #38 of October 1, 1951, RE NIE-41  
: "Probable Developments in the Kashmir Dispute to the End of 1951"

SUBJECT: The receipt is acknowledged of National Intelligence Estimate -41 with respect to probable developments in the Kashmir dispute to the end of 1951.

The Embassy is in general agreement with those sections of this report which analyze the attitudes of Pakistan and India. It is noted, however, that the estimate was prepared in September 1951 and that since that date developments regarding Kashmir have taken a decided turn for the better with the result that some of the conclusions of the estimate require revision.

Among the factors which have led to this changed situation are the following: (1) Publication on October 15, 1951 of a balanced constructive report by Dr. Graham on his demilitarization talks with India and Pakistan; (2) Conciliatory statements by Nehru and other Indian officials following Prime Minister Liaquat's assassination on October 16, 1951; (3) Equally conciliatory statements by the new Pakistan Prime Minister Nazimuddin regarding Indo-Pakistan relations; (4) Prime Minister Nehru's statement to a press conference on November 3 that the Government of India would be prepared to have a non-aggression pact with Pakistan and would also be prepared substantially to reduce its forces in Kashmir and would welcome a plebiscite as early as possible; (5) Adjournment of the Kashmir Constituent Assembly sine die on November 7, possibly until next April, without taking action on the question of accession although statements were made by Prime Minister Abdullah and other Kashmiri officials which indicated they favored accession to India; and (6) Action by the Security Council on November 10 authorizing Dr. Graham to continue his conversations with India and Pakistan regarding demilitarization in Kashmir for another six weeks.

Two of the most important consequences of the foregoing developments are the present relaxation in the critical state of tension which existed between India and Pakistan earlier this year, as indicated in the first conclusion of NIE-41; and the fact that Pakistan has not launched or sponsored local action in Kashmir, as appeared possible when NIE-41 was written.

At the present moment, it seems likely that the Government of India will continue its present conciliatory approach toward Pakistan respecting Kashmir and will avoid any action of a controversial character which might precipitate public debate regarding the issue. Reasons for this attitude may be found in the preoccupation of Indian government officials, who are also members of the Indian National Congress, with India's forthcoming general elections and in the undesirability of making the Kashmir dispute an election campaign issue. Another important reason is the confidence

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New Delhi

December 6, 1951

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Indian government officials have in Dr. Graham and their hope that his current conversations with representatives of India and Pakistan in Paris regarding demilitarization will bear fruit.

Basically, progress is long overdue and, providing none of India's political principles is compromised, a solution of the Kashmir question would be welcomed on economic and financial grounds. Since the outbreak of hostilities in Kashmir in October 1947, that state's normal economic relationships with Pakistan have been disrupted. Furthermore, the possibility of renewed warfare with Pakistan ties down the greater part of the Indian Army in or near Kashmir and prevents any reduction in size which might otherwise be instituted. Dr. Ambedkar, former Law Minister in Prime Minister Nehru's cabinet and the head of the Scheduled Castes Federation, has already drawn attention to the question of the financial cost to India of the Kashmir dispute in the election manifesto of the Federation (Embassy Despatch 871, October 22nd). Although Dr. Ambedkar's view did not subsequently provoke extended comment in the Indian press, many thinking Indians including government planners certainly realize that a solution for the Kashmir question would be economically as well as politically advantageous.

In view of the foregoing, it is believed that relations between India and Pakistan will continue on their present even keel until at least the end of February 1952, when India's general elections are scheduled to be completed. Progress thereafter will depend on the results of the general elections and the success which Dr. Graham achieves in Paris in his demilitarization talks with representatives of India and Pakistan. Regarding the former, it is generally anticipated that Prime Minister Nehru's Indian National Congress will be returned to power and it may, therefore, be expected that India's present policy on Kashmir will be continued. Regarding the latter, if Dr. Graham should be able to report agreement on demilitarization following the conclusion of his talks in Paris about December 22, and if the Security Council should subsequently hold out hope of an early plebiscite in Kashmir by extending Dr. Graham's responsibilities in this respect, definite progress in Indo-Pakistan relations regarding Kashmir and with respect to other problems may well be anticipated.

For the Ambassador:

(signed)

Everett F. Drumright

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Counselor of Embassy (Political)

cc. Karachi, Paris Gadel, London

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